Liberty and representation in Hobbes: A materialist theory of conatus by Bardin, Andrea
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rhei20
History of European Ideas
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rhei20
Liberty and representation in Hobbes: a
materialist theory of conatus
Andrea Bardin
To cite this article: Andrea Bardin (2021): Liberty and representation in Hobbes: a materialist
theory of conatus, History of European Ideas, DOI: 10.1080/01916599.2021.1975150
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/01916599.2021.1975150
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 08 Sep 2021.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 55
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Liberty and representation in Hobbes: a materialist theory of
conatus
Andrea Bardin
Department of Social Sciences, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK
ABSTRACT
The concepts of liberty and representation reveal tensions in Hobbes’s
political anthropology that only a study of the development of his
philosophical materialism can fully elucidate. The first section of this
article analyses the contradictory definitions of liberty offered in De cive,
and explains them against the background of Hobbes’s elaboration of a
deterministic concept of conatus during the 1640s. Variations in the
concepts of conatus and void between De motu and De corpore will
shed light on ideas of individuality, unity and agency that carry direct
political relevance. The second section explains why the concept of
representation that Hobbes elaborated at the end of the decade in
Leviathan cannot be interpreted within an exclusively political and
juridical framework. Rather, I will claim that it should be explained in
the light of Hobbes’s materialist theory of the power exerted by the






Hobbes’s political concepts, while formulated using terminology and presented in a framework that
are mainly political and juridical, are imbued with the underlying materialist assumption that the
reality they describe is ultimately ‘nothing but’matter in motion.1 This often produces a conceptual
tension that is difficult to explain within the limited boundaries of what is usually classified as Hob-
bes’s political thought, and which becomes particularly evident when one studies his political
anthropology. Natural freedom, conceived as the materiality of human natural motions, poses
the problem of having to generate the citizens’ artificially ordered exercise of liberty within the
body politic, the unity of which is realised through the mechanism of representation. The simplicity
of this formula, however, hides problems related to the concepts of ‘liberty’ and ‘representation’ that
only an accurate analysis of the parallel development of Hobbes’s natural and civil philosophy can
disentangle. How can human liberty and political representation be conceptualised and how can
they even be thematised in a mechanical universe made exclusively of matter in motion and
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1OL, I, pp. LXXXIX–XC. Hobbes’s works are abbreviated as follows: DC – Elementorum philosophiae sectio tertia, de cive, in OL, II,
133–432, trans. On the Citizen, ed. R. Tuck and M. Silverstone (Cambridge, 1998); DCo – De corpore, in OL, I, pp. 1–431 and EW I;
DH – De homine, in OL, II, pp. 1–132; DM – Critique du De Mundo de Thomas White, ed. J. Jacquot and H.W. Jones (Paris, 1973),
trans. Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined, ed. H.W. Jones (London, 1976); EL – The Elements of Law Natural and Politic,
ed. F. Tönnies (London, 1889); Lev – Leviathan. The English and Latin texts, 2 vols., ed. N Malcolm (Oxford, 2012); LN – Hobbes
and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, ed. V. Chappel (Cambridge, 1999); OL – Thomae Hobbes malmesburiensis opera philoso-
phica quae latinae scripsit omnia, 5 vols, ed. W. Molesworth (London, 1839–45). I will mainly follow the English translations of
Hobbes’s works, but will modify them on the basis of the Latin original when needed.
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ruled by the laws of physics? My intention here is not to show that Hobbes ultimately answered
these questions, but rather to analyse how some of their implications influenced the development
of his political thought, in which materialism played a crucial role that is still to be fully elucidated.2
The methodological assumption of this paper will be that all the concepts present in Hobbes’s
political theory were meant by their author to be compatible with a materialist ontology and
with the overall purpose of founding a system of sciences based on the model of geometry. This
does not mean that I will consider Hobbes’s political concepts to be directly dependent on his phy-
sics of motion, but I will oppose Tom Sorell’s conclusion that Hobbes’s civil science ‘does not
depend on knowledge of physics and geometry’.3 The reason for this is that, as Noel Malcolm
admits, while there is no single underlying pattern of scientific method connecting Hobbes’s natural
and political philosophy, Hobbes consistently believed that, at least in principle, human nature
could be described in mechanical terms.4 This poses a quite remarkable problem of interpretation
that becomes particularly acute when Hobbes explicitly places political theory within the framework
of his systematic attempt to found all sciences on mechanical materialism, as he does most notably
in De cive, the political treatise he embeds within the lifelong philosophical project that he names
Elementa philosophiae.5
In De cive Hobbes openly commits himself to founding a new scientia civilis as the third pillar of
a system of sciences, and is therefore obliged to elaborate a philosophical anthropology compatible
with both the descriptive aim of natural philosophy and the normative purpose of civil philosophy.6
Because of the peculiar collocation of De cive, this article starts by exposing the tension implicit in
the contradictory definitions of liberty offered by Hobbes within it. De cive provides both a purely
mechanistic and a deterministic definition of liberty as a ‘corporal’ ‘absence of impediments to
motion’, and a more traditional reference to the role played by ‘accident’ or ‘choice’ in human
behaviour (DC, IX.9; OL II.259). This patent contradiction is no mere mistake, it is the symptom
of a crucial problem implicit in the task Hobbes assigned to his research, namely to make political
theory compatible with the mechanical world view that was being elaborated in the light of the Gali-
lean revolution. Hobbes’s attempt to achieve this task proceeded through a reformulation of many
traditional concepts that political and legal thought had usually grounded on human agency and
responsibility, and pushed him to privilege certain aspects of traditional materialisms over others.
In this sense, Hobbes’s system was in fact a work in progress, entailing philosophical choices that
had at the same time ontological and political stakes.
In this vein, I will argue that the changes in Hobbes’s natural philosophy during the 1640s had
far-reaching implications for the coherence of his political thought that cannot be fully understood
within the context of the ‘political agenda’ considered in Quentin Skinner’s analysis of the develop-
ment of Hobbes’s political theory between The Elements of Law and Leviathan.7 My aim is to show
how the conceptualisation of liberty as well as the introduction of the idea of representation in Hob-
bes’s political works interacted with the materialist ‘philosophical agenda’ he was pursuing over the
same timeframe, the core of which was the elaboration of the concepts of conatus and void, and the
development of a radical form of determinism. By doing so, I will show how the study of Hobbes’s
political ideas can be illuminated by issues that, strictly speaking, extend beyond the field of political
thought.
In the first part of my essay I will describe the changing conceptions of liberty in Hobbes’s pol-
itical thought within the wider context of his system: the absence of a definition of liberty in The
2This article adds layers of historical complexity to the analysis of ontological themes explored by other materialist readings of
Hobbes’s political thought (e.g. Frost, Lessons from a Materialist Thinker).
3Sorell, ‘Hobbes’s Scheme of the Sciences’, 56–7.
4Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 155.
5This was the title of the 1668 collection that included De corpore, De homine and De cive as well as the Latin version of Leviathan.
Although De cive was written in 1641, before the completion of the other parts of the system, its original title – Elementa phi-
losophiae Sectio Tertia – testifies to the systematic design to which it belonged.
6Bardin, ‘Materialism and Right Reason in Hobbes’s Political Treatises’.
7Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty.
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Elements of Law when Hobbes’s mechanics was still at its inception, the problematic elaboration of
the concept in De cive while Hobbes was pursuing his work on mechanics at the court of Mersenne
in Paris, and its inclusion within a mature form of ontological determinism in Leviathan. The con-
cept of conatus will be perfectly suited to the purpose for two reasons. Firstly, because it spans both
Hobbes’s natural and civil philosophy, serving as the explanation for all kinds of bodily motion,
natural and artificial.8 Secondly, because its development can be consistently connected to sub-
sequent changes in Hobbes’s political theory. Variations in the concept of conatus will be studied
specifically in relation to the concepts of void and necessity theorised in Hobbes’s natural philos-
ophy, in order to show how these concepts connected with ideas of individuality, unity and agency
that have direct political relevance.
In the second part, I will explain the central place that Leviathan’s concept of representation
occupies in Hobbes’s later political theory by moving away from an exclusively political and juri-
dical reading of the concept and focusing specifically on the materialist basis of Hobbes’s theory of
imagination.9 I will maintain that the concept of representation set out in Leviathan can be inter-
preted as an attempt to solve a problem implicit in De cive’s political treatment of the concept of
liberty, and is therefore strictly related to Hobbes’s elaboration of the concept of conatus during
the 1640s. At the end of the decade, Hobbes deemed the concept of conatus to have been satisfac-
torily integrated within a deterministic theory of matter in motion. The term conatus referred to
both the epistemological ‘principle’ [principium] and the ontological ‘beginning’ [principium]
that could explain and cause the unity of a body.10 Correspondingly, the concept of representation,
the radical theoretical innovation of Leviathan, was able to serve Hobbes’s dual intention of estab-
lishing the principle of the unity of the body politic and of describing how within it the causal power
of the artificial or ‘fictitious [fictitia]’ persona of the sovereign exerted itself over human imagin-
ation.11 Hobbes’s concepts of liberty and representation thus came together in the theorisation
of the effective ‘Fiat’ that was meant to institute, through the material power of imagination, the
‘artificiall life’ of a body politic.
2. Liberty as conatus: the issue of determinism
In De civeHobbes felt it necessary to define explicitly the liberty he had previously conceived in The
Elements of Law as ‘nothing else but [a man’s] natural power’ (EL, II.1.18). In De cive liberty was
connotated, as indeed it had been in The Elements of Law, as the characterising feature of the
state of nature, but it was also specifically defined by Hobbes as one of the founding concepts of
his entire political theory. Because of this, ‘liberty’ was forced to incorporate both the dangerous
libertas of the multitude in the state of nature – the natural, ‘disordered’ motion of uncivilised
humans unsuited to the body politic – and the ordered motion characterising the political liberty
of those subject to imperium, as depicted on De cive’s frontispiece up to the third edition.12 These
two kinds of human ‘motions’ were in tension because they could not, in Hobbes’s monistic mate-
rialism, be assumed to belong to different ontological domains. Human liberty had to be explained
8Barnouw, ‘Le vocabulaire du conatus’, 103–24. The physical concept of conatus can also account for human psychology and
political anthropology. See Jesseph, ‘Hobbes on “Conatus”’, 78–82; Van Apeldoorn, ‘Rationality and Freedom in Hobbes’s The-
ory of Action’, 620.
9The school of Padua’s version of ‘conceptual history’ takes Hobbes’s concept of representation as marking the beginning of a
specifically modern political science that would reduce the ‘political’ to the ‘juridical’ (Chignola, ‘History of Political Thought and
the History of Political Concepts’, 534–41). I am instead exploring the tension between the ‘physical (or quasi-physical)’ termi-
nology and the ‘juridical’ anthropology displayed in Hobbes’s political theory (Balibar, ‘What is “Man” in Seventeenth-Century
Philosophy?’, 223–4).
10The ambiguity in Hobbes’s use of the term ‘principium’ in both the epistemological and the ontological sense should not be
taken as an inaccuracy, but rather as a proof of his materialist understanding of geometry as well as of physics. See Jesseph,
Squaring the Circle, 73 ff.
11In this sense, the ‘link’ between Hobbes’s natural philosophy and his political theory certainly ‘has to do with fiction’ (Foisneau,
‘Elements of Fiction in Hobbes’s System of Philosophy’, 84).
12See Bredekamp, Stratégies visuelles de Thomas Hobbes, 159–63.
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as one of the causes concurring with the physical formation of the body politic and at the same time
studied as an element of the body politic’s theoretical construction. This tension generated different
definitions of liberty in De cive, the problematic, if not contradictory, nature of which has been a
shared assumption in Hobbes scholarship.13
Hood is perhaps the first to point out clearly that, in general, Hobbes’s concept of a ‘liberty to do
or to forbear’ in accordance with one’s own last appetite depends on a ‘corporal’ concept of ‘liberty
in the proper sense’.14 This is what eventually allows Hobbes in Leviathan to univocally conceive
liberty as ‘the absence of externall Impediments’ (Lev, XIV.198), which ‘may be applyed no lesse
to Irrationall, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall’ (Lev, XXI.324). Despite believing Hob-
bes’s conceptual development as a whole to be consistent with his materialist framework, Hood can-
not avoid noting an anomaly in De cive, which also defines human liberty in terms of an absolute
absence of arbitrary impediments, making explicit mention of the possibility of choice [electionem
nostram] and conceding implicitly that chance [accidens] might also play a role in the process (DC,
IX.9; OL II.259). Hood, however, limits himself merely to registering the anomaly, and concludes
that, following the dispute over the issue of liberty and necessity in which he and Bramhall first
engaged in 1645, Hobbes realised his mistake and corrected it by restricting Leviathan’s definition
of liberty to the absence of external impediments.15
Jackson also considers the revisions added by Hobbes to De cive’s 1647 edition,16 which had a
new Praefatio ad lectores and some new explanatory notes, but he does so only in order to underline
the surprising lack of additional thoughts on the topic of liberty in the treatise.17 All these additions
had already been made by early 1646,18 meaning that Hobbes could have included a response to
Bramhall’s attack of his doctrine of liberty and necessity but did not do so. Indeed, the 1647 edition
does not contain even a single passage dedicated to clarifying the issue of liberty, and the only action
ever taken by Hobbes to correct this comes in Leviathan, in which he provides his final definition:
‘LIBERTY, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly), the absence of […] externall Impediments of
motion’ (Lev, XXI.324).
In Skinner’s more wide-ranging argument, theoretical reasons and political motives are inter-
twined. While he accepts Hood’s thesis that the definition of liberty presented in De cive is simply
an error later amended in Leviathan, Skinner sees the development of Hobbes’s political thought in
the 1640s as a path marked by his distinctive ‘political agenda’, the strategic defence of absolutism
against republican theories of liberty. In Skinner’s reconstruction this path was marked by Hobbes’s
progressive abandonment of the dream of providing a politically effective civil science still held in
The Elements of Law and De cive, which subsequently led him in Leviathan to endorse fully the use
of rhetorical strategies for political purposes. It is therefore for reasons of logical coherence as well
as political motives that, according to Skinner, Hobbes modifies the concept of liberty throughout
his three political treatises: liberty is initially ‘described’ and ‘circumscribed’ in The Elements of Law,
‘defined’ in De cive, and eventually ‘redefined’, that is reduced to ‘liberty from external impedi-
ments’, in Leviathan.19 The natural liberty described in The Elements of Law as the undesirable
alternative to the obedience completely lost by political subjects becomes, in De cive, a natural
power absorbed, but not erased, within the citizens’ libertas civilis. Finally, the rediscovery of huma-
nist rhetoric in Leviathan allows Hobbes to ‘redefine’ liberty so that it can at the same time be recog-
nised as a natural fact and radically denied as a political right of subjects facing absolute sovereign
power.20 In other words, while in The Elements of Law natural liberty continued to lurk dangerously
13Scribano, ‘La nozione di libertà nell’opera di Thomas Hobbes’, already counted three contrasting definitions.
14Hood, ‘The Change in Hobbes’s Definition of Liberty’, 155–6.
15Ibid., 155, 159.
16This ‘second’ edition, published in the Netherlands in 1647, was in fact the third: it followed the publication of few copies cir-
culated among friends by Mersenne in 1641, and the ‘first’ edition published in 1642.
17Jackson, Hobbes, Bramhall, 123.
18Malcolm, ‘General Introduction’ in Lev, vol. 1, p. 2.
19Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty, 157.
20Ibid., 162–4.
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behind the scenes of political order, in Leviathan it was fully absorbed within the mechanisms of
sovereign power.21
Even taking into due consideration the anomaly represented by the contrasting definitions of
liberty offered by De cive, all the aforementioned explanations appear unsatisfactory for at least
two reasons. Firstly, they ultimately fail to account for why, inDe cive, Hobbes provided a definition
of liberty as the ‘absence of arbitrary impediments’. Secondly, they fail to question the lack of expla-
natory notes on the topic of liberty in the second edition of De cive, in which Hobbes did clarify
other problematic issues that emerged from his dispute with Bramhall. More generally, the scholar-
ship tends to focus on Hobbes’s political agenda, and does not question the changing conception of
liberty in Hobbes’s ontology and epistemology. By contrast, a specific focus on Hobbes’s philosophi-
cal agenda is instead crucial to my reading. Since De cive was intended to provide a systematic and
definitive foundation for the new civil science within the context of the Elementa philosophiae pro-
ject, a conception of liberty suited to describing the political stakes of human nature also found its
way into a broader explanation of the natural motion of material bodies.
The theoretical problem Hobbes was facing at this stage may be formulated as follows: How can
multiple natural human liberties be made to converge into the artificial unity of a single body poli-
tic? In the 1640s this theoretical exigency helped push Hobbes to reconsider the very concept of
conatus (in English endeavour), the ultimate foundation stone of the mechanical (i.e. scientific)
explanations present in all areas of his philosophy. A whole set of ontological and epistemological
issues connected to this concept was in fact relevant to the theory of the body politic, and this is
worth taking into account when analysing the crucial changes that Hobbes’s political theory under-
went over the same period. Evidence for the shifting meaning of conatus can be found in the differ-
ent understanding of the concept in De motu (1642–43) and De corpore (1655).22 An analysis of
these texts reveals a changing conception of the individuality of a body, and therefore of its agency,
which is of relevance to Hobbes’s concept of conatus and to his adoption of an increasingly open
deterministic ontology during the 1640s.
In De motu, which was written soon after De cive, the term conatus carries both an ontological
and an epistemological meaning. Conatus is the ‘actual motion [motus actualis]’ of a whole body, or
of its inner parts, and at the same time ambiguously ‘identical to the principle of motion [motus
principium]’ that explains it. At the ontological level, conatus refers to the local motion that is con-
tinuously transferred from one body to another: ‘conatus lies in the fact that a body that tends [con-
ans] is moved [moveatur]’.23 This uninterrupted chain of local motions makes it quite difficult to
distinguish individual bodies, thus calling into question the very concept of individual agency.
The ontological homogeneity of the matter involved in the flow of a river, human life, and the
body politic [civitas], is assumed to be more or less self-evident. Only the ‘actual motion’ of a
body, its uninterrupted ‘flux [fluxus]’, can define, despite the changing elements of the matter com-
posing it, the persistence of an individual being [Ens], whether a person or a body politic:
When the motion and the flux are one and the same, the river will also be one and the same. Likewise if one
asks whether a man, when old and young, is the same Being, or body, in number it is clear that, because of the
continual casting of matter and the acquisition of new, it is not the same matter, and hence not the same body;
yet because of the unbroken nature of the flux by which matter decays and is replaced, he is always the same
man. The same must be said of the body politic [de civitate]. When any citizen dies, the matter of the body
politic is not the same, i.e. it is not the same Being. Yet as long as the order [ordo] and motion of government
[regiminis], whence the body politic is named, remain as one, the body politic is the same in number.24
21Piccinini, Corpo politico, 76–7.
22Hobbes wrote the MS just after completing De cive, as an analytical critique to Thomas White’s De mundo. The book covers most
of the physical doctrine Hobbes later included in De corpore (Schuhmann, Hobbes, une chronique, 76).
23DM, XIII.2.118v-119.
24DM, XII.4.111v. Despite eventually reducing the problem of individuation to a semantic issue, Hobbes never stopped seeing the
essence of a body as defined by a ‘specific kind of internal local motion’ (Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism’,
168–70).
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Evidently the element that makes it possible to individuate (homogeneous) matter at the epis-
temological level is the specific kind of motion characterising each individual. However, how
motion works at the ontological level more generally is far less clear, as is the question of how a
specific motion can be separated from others and hence how an individual body can actually
‘be’, independently of others. Perhaps the Epicurean concept of an empty space separating different
bodies could have made full sense of the individuality of bodies and their agency, but Hobbes always
refuted the idea of a macroscopic void.25 As a matter of fact, in De motu the unity of an individual
being can certainly be determined on the basis of the consistency of its motion, but the ontological
‘cause’ of its individuality is hardly explained, meaning that the epistemological and ontological
levels of analysis remain somewhat detached.
Some years later in De corpore, however, Hobbes solved the problem by shifting the very focus of
his understanding of the concept of conatus and its relation to the individual being. A version of the
passage from De motu cited above is included in De corpore, but with some notable variations. The
term ‘principle [principium]’ now also refers to conatus as the ‘beginning of motion’ in an ontologi-
cal sense. The individuality of an ens is no longer defined by the consistency of the ‘flux [fluxus]’ or
of ‘government [regimen]’, but specifically by ‘the beginning of individuation [principium individua-
tionis]’ (DCo, XI.7; OL I.120), that is by the first ‘generative’ motion on which all subsequent
motions depend, whether we are referring to a ‘fountain’ or the ‘institution’ of a ‘city [civitas]’:
[I]f the name be given for such form as is the beginning of motion, then, as long as that motion remains [man-
ente eo principio], it will be the same individual thing; as that man will be always the same, whose actions and
thoughts proceed all from the same beginning of motion [eodem principio (scilicet eo quod fuit in genera-
tione)], namely, that which was in his generation; and that will be the same river which flows from one
and the same fountain, whether the same water, or other water, or something else than water, flow from
thence; and that the same city [civitas], whose acts proceed continually [continuo derivantur] from the
same institution [institutione], whether the men be the same or not. (DCo, XI.7; OL I.122)
Conatus, conceived as an imperceptibly small ‘first motion’ can thus both cause the individuality
of a body and be the principle of its knowledge. A body’s conatus is, in short, the ‘principium’ that
provides both its ontological unity and its epistemological definition.26 However, this is only poss-
ible because all the subsequent motions of that body are the effects of the initial conatus that ‘insti-
tutes’ it, and therefore the knowledge of the former is the sufficient and necessary condition of the
knowledge of the latter. Only a deterministic conception of matter in motion, human and civil mat-
ter included, can legitimise a view in which conatus is a ‘principle’ both in the sense of being an
ontological cause and an epistemological explanation of the individuality of a body.
At this point, few scholars would refuse to describe Hobbes’s materialist mechanics as determi-
nistic. However, by accepting this label they would risk perceiving as an invariant determination of
Hobbes’s philosophy something that was in fact the result of a process full of hesitations and con-
tradictions. This path runs from The Elements of Law, through the violent epistolary dispute with
Descartes on optics and metaphysics and the writing of the first version of De cive in 1641, to the
quarrel with Bramhall in May to July 1645. It was at that final point that Hobbes openly formulated
his theory of necessity, after which he was also forced to deny consistently the existence of void as
such, something that he accepted the need to do in around 1646–1648.27 Once void had been elimi-
nated, the chain of causes connecting the initial conatus to all subsequent motions in each individ-
ual body was closed, and a body’s conatus, conceived as the ‘first motion’, could unfailingly become
the ‘principium’ of that body, that is both the ‘beginning’ of its existence and the ‘principle’ of its
25Hobbes long hesitated on the subject of void, particularly in his optical and physical writings, at times adopting the concept of a
microscopic void (vacuum disseminatum), but he always rejected the idea of a macroscopic void (vacuum coacervatum) (Shapin
and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump, 82–91).
26See note 10 above.
27Bernhardt sees this turn as accomplished only after 1649 (Bernhardt, ‘La question du vide chez Hobbes’, 225), while Sergio
situates it between February-April 1648 (Sergio, Contro il Leviatano, 227–43).
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knowledge. At that point this series of philosophical assumptions signalled the full integration of
determinism into Hobbes’s mechanical philosophy.
In the dispute with Bramhall, Hobbes had to clarify his radical stance on determinism and draw
all its implications for the relation between natural liberty and political power. When challenging
Bramhall’s concept of liberty, Hobbes had to develop a definition that would suit both his materi-
alism and his political theory. Hobbes’s materialism did not allow for any ontological difference
between the ‘last deliberation’ – that is the individual ‘will’ – of men, animals, children, and
‘fools and madmen’ who ‘manifestly deliberate no less than the wisest men’ (LN, II.8.19). ‘Election’
or ‘choice’ follows from the process of deliberation as an effect, and it precedes the action as a cause,
and there can be no ontological difference between the actions (that is motions) of different kinds of
bodies. From this perspective, vacuism was not only politically dangerous because ‘speech on vac-
uum was associated’ with a subversive subculture,28 but it was also ontologically dangerous because
it surreptitiously introduced the possibility of a metaphysical liberty that would make human
behaviour slip beyond the grasp of science, and most notably political science. Only in a void-
less universe made exclusively of matter in motion could the issue of human liberty and agency
be firmly inscribed within the more general knowledge of natural necessity (LN, II.11.20).
The case, however, is not as simple as it might seem. Hobbes’s universe is indeed a complex one
made up of an ‘innumerable number of [causal] chains joined together’ and concurring as the
‘whole cause of an event’ (LN, II.11.20). This totality, however, always remains beyond the grasp
of human knowledge because truth can only be verified ‘by every man’s own sense and memory’
(LN, II.33.39), and no individual can experience the totality of the universe.29 Thus in principle uni-
versal determinism should be no more than a hypothesis responding to the need to theorise a reality
which is, as a whole, by definition inaccessible. But this was not the case. At the time of the Treatise
the die was cast, and Hobbes rejected the concepts of fortune and contingency as merely the marks
of imperfect knowledge, doing so on the basis of an unyielding ontological belief: ‘by contingent,
men do not mean that which has no cause, but that which has not for cause anything that we per-
ceive’ (LN, II.16.28). In the radical form of determinism being adopted by Hobbes at that moment,
the whole set of ‘joined together’ causes led back to the ‘first link God Almighty’ that was their first
cause. This ‘concourse of causes’ could thus be conceived in a way that closely corresponded to the
suggestion that Descartes had long been making, namely that the ‘laws of nature’ in a physical sense
were attributable to ‘the decree of God’ (LN, II.11.20).30 As such, De cive’s concept of ‘arbitrary’
impediments no longer made sense.
From The Elements of Law onwards Hobbes had made clear that he would not allow any theo-
logical solution (either positive or negative) to the question concerning free agency and natural
necessity to become part of his materialist framework.31 In De cive he made clear that he did not
believe that the philosophical issue of free will had been solved by either the Stoics or the Epicureans
(DC, XV.14;OL II.178), while inDe corpore he continued to deny that a ‘philosophical belief’ in God
as ‘first cause’ could be transformed into rational demonstration.32 In the latter work, however, he
did incorporate an accomplished form of ontological determinism into his materialist framework. It
is perhaps legitimate to conclude with Leijenhorst that Hobbes maintained in De motu an
‘epistemological autonomy’ of the secondary causes, although he could not conclude their
‘ontological autonomy’ from a supposed first cause.33 While in De motu he had only accepted
the hypothesis of determinism, in the Treatise he reduced contingency to a mere limit of knowledge
28Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump, 91.
29Even ‘the foreknowledge of God’ ‘cannot be truly said’ a cause. LN, II.11.20.
30Descartes, ‘Letter to Mersenne’, 145.
31What is ‘under the name of fate and contingency, disputed between the Epicureans and the Stoics’ should ‘not [be a] matter of
faith, but of philosophy’ (EL, II.VI.9).
32He explicitly denies such an argument can be demonstrated ‘by reason’ in DCo, XXVI.1; OL I.335–6.
33Leijenhorst, ‘La causalité chez Hobbes et Descartes’, 116. Indeed, Hobbes eventually rejected many of the concepts he had
provisionally adopted as working hypotheses in De motu, such as the ‘plausible hypothesis’ of astrology (Paganini, Introduzione,
41).
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(LN, II.16.28), and in De corpore he finally assumed natural determinism as a fact by means of the
concept of the unity of the ‘whole cause [causa integra]’ (DCo, IX-X;OL, I.106–17). This progressive
shift, completed at the end of the 1640s, from the hypothetical assumption of natural necessity as a
postulate driving philosophical inquiry to a fully-fledged and ontologically consistent adoption of
determinism, may not be at the foreground of Hobbes’s first philosophy or crucial to the under-
standing of its development. It is, however, particularly relevant to the ruminations on the political
concept of liberty that he published in the same decade.
The dispute with Bramhall – in which the themes of natural necessity and human liberty
were debated openly and systematically – can be interpreted as the catalyst that allowed Hobbes
to change his thinking and solve the problem brought to light by the contradictory definitions of
liberty provided in De cive. Aside from assuming a general definition of liberty as the ‘absence of
impediments to motion [absentia impedimentorum motium]’, in De cive Hobbes conceded
that certain arbitrary impediments might exist that would impede motion ‘non absolutely
[non absolute]’ but ‘accidentally [per accidens]’ and usually ‘on our choice [per electionem nos-
tram]’ (DC, IX.9; OL II.259). This definition seems at least in principle to imply the idea of
some sort of human free self-determination, and to contradict a rigorously deterministic ontol-
ogy. The inconsistency was left unresolved by the revised edition of De cive written by
Hobbes in 1646, precisely when, and perhaps because, he was already conceiving and maybe
even working on a new political treatise, Leviathan,34 in which any possible reference to
free determination would eventually be discarded. In this sense, I am assuming that the political
theory of Leviathan should be interpreted as dependent on Hobbes’s full adoption of determin-
ism, in conjunction with his rising awareness of the political relevance of the concept of
conatus.35
Only after the theoretical development that eventually led Hobbes to abandon the idea of void
and fully embrace determinism was complete could the physical concept of conatus as the ‘begin-
ning of motion’ fully and consistently serve the explanation of all the motions of natural as well
as artificial bodies, and become a crucial aspect of his political thought. The problem that Hob-
bes’s materialist ontology of conatus posed to his political theory related to the compatibility
between the (natural) liberty of the individuals comprising the multitude and the (artificial)
unity of the body politic. If the ‘life’ of a body is the same as the persistence of its motion,
and the very ‘life’ of a body politic lacks the internal conatus of natural bodies,36 it will be necess-
ary to provide an adequate artificial substitute for that internal conatus. Because the body poli-
tic’s (artificial) life will rely on the persistence and coherence of the various (natural) individual
lives of which it is comprised, understanding what kind of conatus could possibly transform
these independent motions into a generally coherent and unitary motion was a crucial task
for political theory. This principium had both to work as a central explanatory principle of
the body politic and to indicate the primary cause of its unity. In Leviathan Hobbes believed
he had been able to do so by connecting the traditional concept of persona to an entirely new
way of understanding political representation that would explain how the institution of an ade-
quate first cause would keep the political ‘automaton’ indeterminately in motion, as if it were,
however ‘Mortall’, a god.37
34Hobbes was revising De cive in the spring of 1646 in view of the 1647 edition, which may have contributed to his decision to
write a new political treatise: Leviathan (Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 330–1. See also Malcolm, in Lev, 12). As a matter of fact,
the text of De cive underwent no further revision after the writing of Leviathan.
35I am assuming here that Hobbes’s decision to embrace a radical form of determinism is far from the inevitable outcome of his
materialist premises. On the contrary, I am suggesting that there is an internal tension between determinism and materialism,
because determinism implies the existence of eternal and unchanging truths (the ‘laws’ of nature) that a materialism of matter
in motion cannot easily admit (Bardin, ‘The Monstrosity of Matter in Motion’).
36Hobbes’s ontological explanation for what we call ‘life’ is not very detailed. Although, in general, ‘vital’motion specifically takes
place in the heart, Hobbes ultimately assumes that the particles of all kinds of bodies provide their specific, inherent motion
(Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism, 166).
37Hobbes famously names the ‘COMMON-WEALTH’ or ‘CIVITAS’ a ‘Mortall God’ in Lev, XVII.260.
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3. A material principium for the body politic: representation and imagination
Hobbes’s use of the theological-juridical concept of persona as a means to explain how ‘AMultitude
of men, are made One Person’ is the core of Leviathan chapter XVI (Lev, XVI.248). However, the
concept was not an original element of Hobbes’s final political treatise. Although it underwent note-
worthy variations, the concept had in fact been present even in the first draft of his political the-
ory.38 In the second part of The Elements of Law, Hobbes had clarified that its purpose was to
explain ‘how a multitude of persons natural are united by covenants into one person civil or
body politic’ (EL, II.I.1). As in Leviathan, in this earlier text a ‘civil person’ could be either a
‘man’, in which case the sovereign would be a natural person, or a ‘council’, that is an artificial per-
son whose will would include ‘the will of every one in particular’, and there was no differentiation
between the two (EL, II.II.11). Moreover, it was clear from the beginning of Hobbes’s political the-
ory that the ability of a person’s ‘will’ to make a multitude of individual motions converge in the
collective motion of a body politic did not depend on the nature of the person (i.e. natural or
civil) but relied instead on its unity (EL, II.I.18).39 In short, Hobbes’s first political treatise already
included most of the elements commonly linked to his concept of persona. More specifically, it also
implied the existence of a physical nexus between the unity of the person and its ‘power’, conceived
as a motion that can govern further motions, human actions included. The unity of the civil per-
son’s ‘will’ was therefore explicitly connected to its actual power. Yet despite this, the material
dynamics of the forces that bring about the unity of that person in the first place were hardly ques-
tioned in The Elements of Law.
In De cive the concept of persona entirely substitutes the classical concept of a ‘body politic’
largely employed in Hobbes’s former work,40 but this does not mark a change of approach as far
as the physical mechanism is concerned. Notwithstanding the more frequent use of the concept
of persona, which appears quite reasonable given the book’s exclusive focus on politics, De cive
still lacks any physical explanation of how the individuation of the artificial person comes about.
The aim of chapter V, On the Causes and Generation of a Civitas, remains that of explaining
how ‘a number of natural persons from fear of each other have coalesced into one civil person
to which we have given the name of commonwealth’ (DC, V.12; OL II.215). However, this pas-
sage explains that, rather than how, the natural powers of individual persons converge into the
artificial power of a collective person whose ‘will’ provides it with the legitimacy to use its
‘strengths and powers [viribus et facultatibus]’ in order to grant peace (DC, V.9; OL II.214).
De cive’s primary interest lays in legitimising the juridical unity of the will rather than in
explaining the appetites that come together to bring it about. There is no physical explanation
of how ‘multiple wills are contained [continetur] in the will of one’ (DC, X.5; OL II.268), and no
analysis of the material mechanisms of the natural and artificial powers involved in the process
is provided. Indeed, the incumbent civil war drove Hobbes to publish De cive prematurely, at a
time when his system of sciences was still a work in progress, as was his materialist framework.
Notably, as Hobbes openly admitted a few years later in De cive’s new Praefatio ad lectores,
which he wrote in 1646 while planning Leviathan,41 he realised (‘I saw’) that the new civil
science could be built ‘upon its own principles known by experience [experientia cognitis]’
(DC, Praef.; OL II.151). As a matter of fact, in De cive Hobbes did not provide an ontological
explanation of the mechanisms underlying the collective agency that characterised the body poli-
tic. What I am suggesting here is that Leviathan was his attempt to do so through the concept of
‘representation’.
38Olsthoorn, ‘Leviathan Inc.’.
39‘Body politic […] signifieth not the concord, but the union of many men’ (EL, II.VIII.7).
40Moving from The Elements of Law to De cive, the notion of body politic is entirely dismissed by Hobbes in favour of the concept
of person, before offering central stage to the concept of representation in Leviathan. See Crignon, De l’incarnation à la rep-
résentation, 163–79, 219 ff.
41See note 36 above.
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In LeviathanHobbes injected the polysemic term ‘representation’ (at the same time optical, thea-
trical, epistemological and juridical42) into the traditional theological-juridical concept of persona.
The originality of this combination has induced many scholars to overlook the physical meaning
that the two concepts joined together acquire in Leviathan if they are looked at through the lens
of Hobbes’s materialism. The use of the word ‘to represent’ to mean ‘to bear the person of the
People’ (Lev, XXIX.512), that is to act in the name of a group of individual bodies under the con-
dition that there be no more than one person, is certainly a novelty introduced in Leviathan.43
While a natural body is a person endowed with a will, the collective artificial body must be ‘perso-
nated’ to acquire a unitary motion, in other words a unitary will. Thus the political body requires
the power of a sovereign representative in order to be able to will and act coherently (and therefore
to exist as an individual body): ‘a Common-wealth, without Soveraign Power, is but a word, without
substance, and cannot stand’ (Lev, XXXI.554).44 The subject taking action is the ‘Persona civitatis,
the Person of the Common-wealth’ (Lev, XXVI.414), but the civil person can only act through the
sovereign person. In other words, a Commonwealth (like any other ‘thing personated’45) can only
become such because of the ontological power of the sovereign’s act of representation. By making
civil law, that is ‘the Will and Appetite of the State’, the ‘measure’ of good (Lev, XLVI.1090), the
sovereign provides juridical qua physical unity to individual liberties and wills, transforming
them into the unitary will and motion of the civil person.
The concept of ‘representation’ certainly responded to a problem of legitimation, while the con-
cept of ‘authorisation’ helped shift juridical imputability from the sovereign to the citizens, and both
no doubt proved crucial to the emerging theory of the impersonal power of the modern state.46
However, these concepts were also meant to solve a series of problems related to the material pro-
duction and continuation of the unity of the sovereign persona and hence of the body politic. For
this reason, seen from the perspective of Hobbes’s materialism the concept of representation
appears to be Leviathan’s true innovation. In Hobbes’s materialist framework ‘representation’
can only refer to a coherentmotion, an act of representation, rather than to a unitary representative
body. That is why a satisfactory explanation of the concept of political representation in Leviathan
should not be limited to the conceptual framework provided by its juridical form but should also
take into account its physical meaning. From this perspective, although many scholars see the con-
cept of authorisation as one of Hobbes’s most original contributions to the theory of the state,47 I
interpret it as the translation into formal and juridical terms of a physical understanding of rep-
resentation. My reading therefore focusses on the concept of representation as the key to the unifi-
cation of natural human powers into one conatus, that is into a coherent motion and indeed into the
‘life’ of the body politic. As I will demonstrate in what follows, this interpretation relies on establish-
ing how Hobbes’s conception of conatus as the ‘first cause’ of the unity of a body and his conception
of imagination as a material power were relevant to his political anthropology.
As explained in the first part of this article, at the same time as Hobbes was conceiving Leviathan,
as early as 1646–1647, he was also elaborating his deterministic theory of conatus. As a result, he
established that the unity and coherence of a body’s motion depended on the unity of its principium,
conceived as the first cause, and the civil body, of course, could be no exception. The body politic,
however, is a peculiarly artificial automaton, given that it is an artificial assemblage of pre-existing
natural bodies into an artificial self-moving machine whose conatus is neither exclusively given and
42Brito Vieira, The Elements of Representation in Hobbes.
43See, for instance, Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, p. 223.
44The phrase ‘cannot stand’ recurs several times in Leviathan connected to the issues of unity and division. See Lev, XVIII.278,
XXVI.448, XXIX.510, XXXI.554.
45In the title of Leviathan’s chapter XVI either ‘Persons’, ‘Authors’, and ‘Things Personated’ appear. As Hobbes will explain in De
homine, ‘even an inanimate thing [i.e. a non-living body] can be a person [i.e. personated], that is, can have possessions and
other goods and be able to act at law [i.e. become an author through an actor]’ (DH, XV.4; OL II.132). It is worth noting that this
applies as well to ‘temples’, ‘bridges’ and, of course, to the commonwealth itself.
46On the rhetorical-juridical dispositif of ‘authorisation’ in Leviathan, see Piccinini, Corpo politico, 82.
47See Zarka, Hobbes et la pensée politique moderne, 15; Skinner, Visions of Politics, 183.
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inherent, as it is in animals (humans included),48 nor exclusively artificial and dependent on human
construction, as it is in machines. Human ‘matter’ is so complex that its motions can be somewhat
limited by ‘external impediments’, but its internal motions, and therefore its will, can scarcely be
controlled. Hobbes was perfectly aware that no law – whether civil or natural – could cover the
whole range of prescriptions needed for the purpose. In other words, no law could ever become
‘the whole cause’ driving each individual conatus to contribute to the overall functioning of a
body politic. Even if ‘to make the law is […] to make a cause of justice and to necessitate justice’
(LN, I.14.25), civil laws relate only to ‘the will and no other precedent causes of action’ (LN,
I.14.24). In some cases, laws may therefore be a ‘sufficient and therefore necessary cause’ (LN,
I.16.29) of justice, but certainly not the complete and permanent cause needed for a well-established
commonwealth. Reason and the sciences also cannot be a sufficient cause, as long as they remain a
‘small Power, because not eminent’ (Lev, X.134). None of these forces can work as a universally
effective principium driving human natural motions to converge into the unitary motion of the
body politic. Civil laws and civil science can only work as partial causes of the unity of the body
politic, but never as the whole cause [causa integra]. A more powerful artificial principium must
therefore be set in motion in order for the body politic to be granted stable unity.
When Hobbes wrote Leviathan he was fully aware that an effective ‘whole cause’ for the unifi-
cation of a body politic could only be provided by adequately compelling human actions and
thoughts – i.e. by regulating human natural motion both externally and internally – through vio-
lence, persuasion, fear and hope. As the two pillars supporting the sovereign person featured on the
book’s frontispiece perhaps suggest, civil power could use two types of tools to enforce natural laws
and make individual liberties compatible with the functioning of the body politic. These tools,
which traditionally belonged to temporal and spiritual powers, had to be unified in a single ‘Com-
mon-wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill’ in order to make the individual citizen unable to stand against
it and willing to submit even when the rationality of such obedience was not acknowledged. On the
one hand, civil laws could externally work as partial impediments to human actions, either by
opposing or guiding them, depending on the situation:
The use of laws is not to bind the people from voluntary actions, but to direct and keep them in such a motion
as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires […] not to stop travellers, but to keep them in the
way. (Lev, XXX.335, italics added)
On the other hand, political power also had to overcome the internal resistance of individual
wills, ‘For the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions; and in the well governing of
Opinions, consisteth the well governing of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and Concord’
(Lev, XVIII.272). Only the joint exercise of power over the external and internal motions
defining natural human conatus could ‘reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one
Will’ (Lev, XVII.260).
As some scholars have perceived, there are Tacitean undertones in Hobbes’s project of ‘govern-
ing’ human imagination by grounding ‘the authority of […] Princes […] on the Consent of the
People’ (Lev, XXXL.740),49 and many share the view that a unique use of rhetoric defines the
peculiar style of Leviathan, revealing its author’s unusual view of the purposes of civil science.50
Hobbes’s task, however, was to rework the arcana imperii to fit his materialist framework and
find an artificial equivalent of the ancient wisdom of the sovereign for his political automaton.
He needed something that could prove to be a less arbitrary yet equally effective conatus, in
other words a first cause similar to the principle of the generation of natural living bodies capable
of giving the body politic ‘artificiall life’ (Lev, Introduction.16). Finding such a solution required a
solid materialist theory of imagination as causal ‘power’.
48See note 35 above.
49See Malcolm ‘Reason of State’, 120–2.
50Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan; Prokhovnik, Rhetoric and Philosophy; Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric.
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In Hobbes’s mature anthropology imagination is ‘sense decaying’ whose products – ‘phantasms’
called ‘fancy and, in Latin, imaginatio’ (DCo XXV.7)51 – are the physical continuation in human
‘organs’ of the motion of the senses. More precisely, imagination is an internal motion of bodies,
a ‘perpetual arising of phantasms’ within human beings and other animals, and it has no less causal
power than the senses, despite being ‘commonly called the discourse of mind’ (DCo XXV.8; OL
I.325). In short, imagination is part of the physical causes on which will – ‘the last deliberation’,
that is the final effect in the chain of internal motions, which, in turn, is the first cause of the (exter-
nal) motion of a living body – depends. As Hobbes wrote in Leviathan, ‘Imagination is the first
internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion’ (Lev, VI.78, italics added). With this concept of a cau-
sal power of imagination in mind, Hobbes’s idea of a unity of the ‘feigned’ person acquires a mean-
ing that is rather more physical than merely ‘linguistic’, as he openly claims in relation to the word
‘soul’ (LN, II.20.32),52 which in the introduction to Leviathan famously describes the sovereign’s
role in the political ‘automaton’.
It is only through these materialist lenses that Hobbes’s conception of imagination is shown to be
fully compatible with, and even implied by, the concept of representation that Hobbes elaborated in
Leviathan. A materialist interpretation of the ‘act’ of representation might seem to have been con-
tradicted by Hobbes’s claim that representation always works, whether the actor is a ‘natural’ person
acting ‘Truly’ or an assembly acting ‘by Fiction’ as a ‘Feigned or Artificiall person’ (Lev, XVI.244). In
the final systematisation of his theory in De homine, however, he clearly restates that the nature of
the person does not affect its representative function because, whether the person be ‘natural [nat-
uralis]’ or ‘fictitious [fictitia]’, the action should always be attributed to the ‘civil [civilem]’ person
(DH, XV.1; OL II.130). This claim has obvious juridical implications, but a careful consideration of
the concept of a ‘fictitious’ person demonstrates that it must also be understood as a physical expla-
nation. While it is true that the sovereign person is a ‘fancy’, fancies and their effects are nevertheless
actual motions and can be quite powerful ones. It is therefore clear that an ‘artificial person’ is ‘ima-
gined’ in a sense that should not be understood as being opposed to ‘real’. In fact, a person is ‘ficti-
tious [fictitia]’ in the same way that political bodies are ‘artificial, and fictitious Bodies’ (Lev,
XXII.352) that actually exist and ‘act’. In Hobbes’s materialism ‘fictitious’ bodies are endowed
with the same physical causality as any other artificial body. This is why in the English Leviathan
he uses the term ‘person’ to refer without discrimination to both the representer (as in Lev, XVI)
and the represented (as in Lev, XLII). It is also the reason why he distinguishes between persona
‘raepresentativa’ and ‘propria’ in the Latin Leviathan, just as he does between persona ‘fictitia’
and ‘naturalis’ in De homine, always without undermining the underlying materialist assumption
of the ‘fictitious’ person’s capacity to act.53 In the case of the sovereign person this capacity, how-
ever, depends on a specific kind of causality achieving its effects by the mediation of the motions of
the mind and, more specifically, through human imagination.
The fact that Hobbes conceives imagination as a material power is precisely the reason why a
fictitious person’s act of representation can be understood in material terms as an adequate
cause capable of providing unity to the body politic. Hobbes’s materialist theory of imagination
and representation thus explains the twofold power embodied in the persona fictitia: the power
it derives from the individual powers it ‘personates’, and the power it exerts on the citizen’s ‘internal’
motions (wills) and hence on their external motions (actions). As is the case with the principles ani-
mating living bodies, the sovereign person’s ‘office’ is undoubtedly the establishment and continu-
ation of the body politic, but this should not be identified with its ‘bare Preservation’. On the
contrary, Hobbes openly relates the salus populi to the citizens’ active participation in ‘all other
51‘Phantasmate, phantasia, et Latinis imaginatio’ (OL I.323).
52Here Hobbes clearly opposes the actual existence of the group (a commonwealth or a family) to the linguistic status of the
human soul.
53‘Persona est, cui verba et actiones hominum attribuuntur vel suae [naturalis] vel alienae [fictitia]’ (DH, XV.1; OL II.130). See Farnesi
Cammellone, ‘Il potere della visione’, 75–7. Within Hobbes’s own framework, I therefore see no issues with the state being both
artificial and fictitious ‘in the strict sense of imaginary’ (Skinner, Visions of Politics, 189).
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Contentments of life, which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Com-
mon-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe’ (Lev XXX.520). These individual motions cannot be sup-
pressed without killing the body politic, and yet their convergence can only be granted in the
first place by the overwhelming causal power exerted by the person’s unitary act of representation.
Representation should therefore be conceived as a physical qua imaginary cause that can make a
plurality of natural ‘liberties’ (i.e. wills and therefore actions, that is necessary motions54) converge
in an artificially unitary and coherent motion governed by a single conatus.
The study of representation conceived as a principium – the explanatory principle as well as the
first cause of the body politic – became a crucial purpose of Hobbes’s civil science at the end of the
1640s. Leviathan took fancies seriously in pursuit of that purpose, even going so far as to, as it were,
to theorise its own power as fancy. Along with the fittingly celebrated rhetorical use of the frontis-
piece and the abundance of biblical sources exploited in parts III and IV, Hobbes’s theory of rep-
resentation certainly contributed to the invention of a ‘sign of the state’55 capable of understanding
and directing the actions of the subjects from within thanks to the material power of imagination.
4. Conclusion
Students of the political Hobbes often overlook the fact that he never abandoned the materialist
assumption informing his whole philosophical project, which implied that everything should, at
least in principle, also be comprehensible in terms of local motion. However far Hobbes’s political
thought may be from a merely physical explanation of the functioning of the body politic, interpret-
ations of his scientia civilis can be furthered by the assumption that all its concepts should as far as
possible be explored in terms compatible with the overall materialist framework he adopted in his
system of sciences. On the basis of this, I have assumed that explanations of Hobbes’s concepts of
liberty and representation should neither be limited to the exigencies dictated by his political
agenda nor formulated within the boundaries of the language he uses in his political philosophy.
These and other concepts in Hobbes’s political theory should also be explained in the light of
the wider philosophical agenda that drove his research for a relatively long part of his remarkably
long life. The need to conceive of liberty in terms ontologically compatible with the geometric
imagination of material motion established by the Galilean science created a tension in Hobbes’s
political theory, and notably also in his political anthropology, since the latter was meant to be
at once descriptive of human natural motions and normative for the purpose of their domestication
in view of the construction of an artificial body politic. This tension was first evidenced by the con-
tradictory definitions of liberty offered in De cive (1642).
During the 1640s Hobbes’s natural philosophy underwent a transformation that had remarkable
consequences for his political theory. Hobbes came to adopt a radical form of ontological determin-
ism, ruling out the existence of void and consequently re-elaborating his own concept of conatus.
He shifted from defining the conatus as the consistency of a body’s motion to specifically using the
term to refer to the small ‘first motion’ that causes a body and its subsequent motions. This concept
of conatus could thus be taken as a principium that provided the key to understanding the function-
ing of all bodies in light of their first cause, human individuals and the collective body politic
included. Once a radical form of ontological determinism was established in Hobbes’s natural phil-
osophy, no space remained for the ‘arbitrary impediments’ evoked in De cive’s problematic political
anthropology. In Leviathan (1651) the purpose of political theory became the institution of an ade-
quate cause that would make each individual conatus coincide with the unitary functioning of the
body politic’s collective conatus, unifying the natural ‘liberties’ of the citizens by driving them from
within. This principium was formulated there in terms of ‘representation’.
54‘Actions which men voluntarily doe: which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from liberty’ (Lev XXI.326).
55Bredekamp, Stratégies visuelles de Thomas Hobbes, 67–8. See also Douglass, ‘The Body Politic’, 142–4.
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The image of the representative person theorised in Leviathan was deemed capable of driving the
dangerous natural liberty of humans into a necessary element of the institution of sovereign power.
Far from abolishing individual agency, the concept of natural determinism allowed Hobbes to insert
a materialist concept of liberty into his political theory. The need to explain the foundation, pro-
duction and preservation of political order was thus solved by joining the concepts of determinism
and liberty through the mediating function of the representative person. While representation
established sufficient cause for the unity of the body politic, determinism provided political agency
with consequentiality by connecting the sovereign representative to the citizens’ internal motions.
The genuine efficacy of this chain of cause–effect relations came through the material power of
imagination, which was alone in being able to produce effectively the unity that the concept of per-
sona was staging. As a result, the mechanism of representation – working as a sort of self-fulfilling
prophecy – was meant to explain both the power that the body politic derives from the active par-
ticipation of its members, and the power it exerts on their will to participate.
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